The growth in importance of transnational actors, particularly those from the business sector, has been dramatic in the area of global finance. It is not only that the volume and velocity of global capital flows has increased over the last two decades; it is also that efforts to govern various aspects of global finance have evolved. One of the distinguishing features of financial governance in the contemporary era is its use of public as well as private actors. In many instances, regulatory efforts depend on public (government) agents to set rules, and on a combination of public and private sector enforcement. It is now not only "clubs" of powerful governments, but also groups of private sector actors, quasi-governmental agencies, and transgovernmental groups that attempt to create and enforce rules. Despite the growth in private sector participation in global financial governance, and the implications of this growth for questions of equity and efficiency, recent scholarship in international political economy provides few systematic assessments of the sources of variation in 2 international financial governance, and does little to investigate the consequences of this variation, 1 in terms of regulatory efficiency and distributional equity. This paper begins with a discussion of the regulation of global finance, with special attention to the public and private sources of governance, and the evolution of governance over time. I present two hypotheses regarding the impact of private sector participation on regulatory efforts -a distributional hypothesis and an effectiveness hypothesis. I argue that, while private sector participation may increase the effectiveness of international and transnational rule-setting efforts, it also can have distributional consequences. Financial institutions have tended to serve the interests of powerful states, and of powerful constituencies within those states, thereby limiting their progress in equity. The private actors that help develop governance regimes tend to come from the financial sector; as a result, privately-developed regimes are likely to reflect their interests. This presents the global community with a difficult challenge -to broaden the voice of developing countries and nonfinancial actors in the regulatory process, while maintaining the cooperation of developed nations and financial sector players. The paper concludes with an initial empirical assessment of the effectiveness hypothesis.
1
In 1971, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye called for greater attention to the role of "transnational actors" in world politics (Keohane and Nye, 1971) . They recommended greater attention to the effects of transnational actors on formal international institutions and on the global distribution of wealth and power was necessary, as was the development of an alternative to the statecentric paradigm. During the nearly 35 years since Keohane and Nye edited the 1971 special issue of International Organization, a wide variety of scholars has acknowledged and explored the role of such actors, not only in economic realms, but in human rights, the environment, and military operations (see, for instance, Slaughter 2004) . At the same time, the intensification of globalization, the rise of "complex interdependence," and the accompanying technological advances, have rendered transnational actors -including multinational corporations, institutional investors, banks, and non-governmental organization -increasingly important to the conduct of world politics.
The growth in importance of transnational actors, particularly those from the business sector, has been dramatic in the area of global finance. It is not only that the volume and velocity of global capital flows has increased over the last two decades; it is also that efforts to govern various aspects of global finance have evolved. One of the distinguishing features of financial governance in the contemporary era is its use of public as well as private actors. In many instances, regulatory efforts depend on public (government) agents to set rules, and on a combination of public and private sector enforcement. It is now not only "clubs" of powerful governments, but also groups of private sector actors, quasi-governmental agencies, and transgovernmental groups that attempt to create and enforce rules. Despite the growth in private sector participation in global financial governance, and the implications of this growth for questions of equity and efficiency, recent scholarship in international political economy provides few systematic assessments of the sources of variation in international financial governance, and does little to investigate the consequences of this variation, 1 in terms of regulatory efficiency and distributional equity. This paper begins with a discussion of the regulation of global finance, with special attention to the public and private sources of governance, and the evolution of governance over time. I present two hypotheses regarding the impact of private sector participation on regulatory efforts -a distributional hypothesis and an effectiveness hypothesis. I argue that, while private sector participation may increase the effectiveness of international and transnational rule-setting efforts, it also can have distributional consequences. Financial institutions have tended to serve the interests of powerful states, and of powerful constituencies within those states, thereby limiting their progress in equity. The private actors that help develop governance regimes tend to come from the financial sector; as a result, privately-developed regimes are likely to reflect their interests. This presents the global community with a difficult challenge -to broaden the voice of developing countries and nonfinancial actors in the regulatory process, while maintaining the cooperation of developed nations and financial sector players. The paper concludes with an initial empirical assessment of the effectiveness hypothesis.
I. The Governance of International Finance
Mirroring a general trend in global economic governance, international and transnational efforts at financial regulation have increased dramatically in recent years (Armijo 2002; Council on Foreign Relations 1999; Eichengreen 1999; Goldstein 1998) . 2 States were not the only important participants in post-World War II institutional efforts, but they remained the locus of -and the ultimate participants in --much regulatory activity. While not all these efforts were immediate successes (e.g. the failed effort to govern trade via an ITO), they did represent a significant effort to 1 Recent exceptions are Mattli and Büthe's work (2003) on the role of the private sector in the development of international product standards and Farrell's (2003) account of the EU-US agreement on internet data privacy. 2 Drezner (2003b) notes that "none of the financial standards now considered to be important by the IFIs existed prior to 1996." (p. 19). Simmons (2001) points out, however, that governance efforts in international finance have been less comprehensive and less legalized that in international trade.
ensure the supply of economic openness, exchange rate stability, and development funds. The obligations created by these entities were largely "at the border," requiring governments to change the ways in which they treated external actors and flows (e.g. their tariff levels), but not to change their domestic policies or institutions.
Following somewhat steady growth in the 1970s and 1980s, the pace and depth of global regulation increased dramatically in the 1990s. Some institutional frameworks were created or expanded; others became more legalized. The increase in international governance is both a cause and an effect of economic openness (e.g. Keohane 2002; Slaughter 2004) . As trade and financial linkages among nations expand, so does the extent to which national actions and policies generate regional or global externalities. 3 Moreover, some of the national deregulation undertaken in the 1980s created a vacuum, particularly with the increased salience of "behind the border" issues (Helleiner 2002 , Kaul et al 2003 , which demanded not only changes in governments' policies vis-à-vis external actors, but also revisions in domestic policies, such as taxation, banking regulation, and subsidies (Keohane and Nye, 2001) . Hence, "re-regulation" has emerged at the international level (Kapstein 1992 , Ronit and Schneider 2000 , Vogel 1996 , and the contemporary era has witnessed a shift in the subjects of public international law, from only states to states plus individuals and firms, as well as a trend away from "soft law" and norms and toward "hard law" and treaties (e.g. Goldstein et al 2000) .
The functional need to govern various aspects of financial globalization presents challenges both to our current system of international institutions and to our understandings of international governance. First, as Karl Polanyi pointed out in 1944, and as Dani Rodrik (1997) and others have noted more recently, economic openness is sustainable only as long as there is public support for it.
When publics doubt the legitimacy of intergovernmental economic institutions, and economic openness more generally, the continued trend toward economic globalization may be endangered.
Many of the contemporary challenges to the legitimacy of international institutions are based on the often great disparities in the influences of states on regulatory regimes. The international institutions that provide solutions to functional problems may take a variety of forms.
The particular regulatory system that emerges is likely to benefit some actors (states or private actors) in particular, and these benefits have distributional consequences, both internationally and within societies (Krasner 1991; Mattli and Büthe 2003; Rosenbluth and Schaap 2003) . 4 For instance, while developed and developing nations tend to have very different preferences over regulatory issues (e.g. Eichengreen 2003) , the views of developed nations often hold sway, and the prevailing model of financial governance is that of the club. 5 But, as a variety of citizens, NGOs and developing nations has begun to worry about the legitimacy of global governance, the club model has come under threat Nye 2001, 2003; Slaughter 2004 ).
Second, the recent attention to "behind the border" issues has been accompanied by an increase in the importance and participation of private sector actors, or "transnational actors."
Various non-state actors -banks and investment houses, multinational corporations (MNCs), and civil society groups (NGOs) -are important to the provision of information and the implementation of rules. Some international regulatory regimes have begun to include these groups -or least the business and financial components -explicitly; others consult private sector actors informally. The 4 Such an argument focuses on games of cooperation, rather than on games of pure coordination, in which actors are indifferent among outcomes, provided each chooses the same outcome. 5 Simmons (2001) argues that, where the major states have been able to agree and to act as leaders in the process, a more legalized set of rules -making explicit rights, responsibilities, and dispute-settlement procedures -has prevailed. Where major states have not had such consensus, the development of rules has remained more ad-hoc, or has focused more on the private sector. Drezner (2003b) Regulatory regimes in international finance can serve two broad -and not necessarily opposing --purposes: to improve global levels of efficiency, and to facilitate a more equitable distribution of financial resources among societies. 7 Within the broad concept of efficiency, three specific, and sometimes overlapping, elements are important: (a) allocation of investment in a generally efficient manner, ensuring that capital is put to its most productive uses; (b) stability of international financial flows, thereby avoiding the costs generated by financial crises and volatility;
and (c) the lowest possible transaction costs, further facilitating the movements of resources across international borders. Equity could encompass the distribution of resources at the international level 6 On issues of compliance with international law, see Downs, Rocke and Barsoon 1995 , Mitchell 1994 , and Simmons 2000 International regulation, of course, also may aid in the achievement of other sorts of public goods, such as the protection of environmental resources and the prevention of terrorist activities.
(among developing nations, or between developed and developing countries), as well as the distribution of resources within countries (among different economic groups, for instance). Magnoli (2002) for a discussions of the potential relationships between equity and efficiency, as well as the various types of efficiency (in production, coordination, or allocation) and equity (in access, capabilities, and results). 9 Recent research (e.g. Stone 2002 , Vreeland 2003 , as well as longer-standing concerns about moral hazard, however, suggest that the IMF's role as a catalyst to private finance may be problematic.
encourage governments -via interest rate penalties -to avoid profligate policies. 10 And international rules also could assist with the resolution of crises once they occur; for instance, procedures for the orderly workout of sovereign debt would facilitate borrowers' returns to global capital markets and reduce the extent of contagion to other nations (Eichengreen 1999 , Herman 2003 .
Third, and related to the first two efficiency-oriented tasks, reduction of transaction costs in international capital markets also improves market efficiency. Some regulations can reduce private agents' uncertainty, standardize behaviors across countries, and generate network externalities. 10 For a discussion of the extent to which these sort of financial market pressures vary across groups of countries, see Mosley (2003a) . 11 Simmons (2001) notes that there are strong incentives for countries to emulate the accounting standards of the most powerful economy; she points out that, dating to an era in which most stock trading occurred within the same or nearby time zones, there has been a regional pattern of accounting standards. For instance, Canada's standards resemble US standards, and Scandinavian standards resemble German standards (p. 609). 
II. The Role of the Private Sector
The Nature of Financial Regulation. (Crouzet and Véron 2002 , Cutler 2003 , Mosley 2003b ).
12 Keohane and Nye (2001) point out that there are many ways to govern globalization, ranging from unilateral actions by states (which may then be followed by others), to multilateral state efforts, to transnational and transgovernmental cooperation (which may involve components of states, or only non-state actors). Along similar lines, functionalist reasoning makes a case as to why cooperation is desirable, but it does not predict the specific form of governance that emerges (Kahler and Lake 2003) . 
Crisis Prevention and Management
• Systemic oversight and monitoring.
• Regulation of international banking practices.
• IMF, Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
• Basel Accords • Arbitration based on agreements between governments and private actors.
• Global rules for host country behavior.
• Bilateral rules for host country behavior.
• Regional rules for host country behavior and dispute settlement.
• (Buria 2003) . Similarly, the development of the 1988 Basel Accord on bank capital adequacy largely reflected a bilateral deal between the U.S. and the U.K., onto which the remaining G-10 nations signed (Kapstein 1992) .
Given the size of its capital market, U.S. regulators had incentives to set standards unilaterally, disregarding divergence by other governments. The scope of the agreement's influence expanded further with time, as many countries that were not participants in the G-10 forum nonetheless 13 Such an argument focuses on games of cooperation, rather than on games of pure coordination, in which actors are indifferent among outcomes, provided each chooses the same outcome. 14 For instance, in her account of regulatory harmonization processes, Simmons (2001) argues that the majority of international regulatory harmonization in the 1980s and 1990s was driven not by "mutual adjustment" (cooperation among states), but by "unilateral decisions imposed by the dominant financial centers on other jurisdictions." (p. 591).
adopted the Accord's main directives, such as the eight percent capital standard and rules on providing information about derivatives trading (Simmons 2001) . In the Basel case, national states were the source of the regulation, but only a small set of states was involved in the design of the rules. And, while banking supervision has evolved since the 1980s, the Basel Committee's orientation toward practices in major financial centers has remained (Eatwell and Taylor 2002 , Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2003 , Oatley and Nabors 1998 .
Another example of this general pattern is the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which was established in the late 1990s and has promulgated a set of twelve key financial codes and standards (Drezner 2003b , Eichengreen 2003 . 15 Developing nations had little input into the design of the private banks' desire to maintain a reputation for doing legitimate banking business (Helleiner 2002 ).
This provides a parsimonious explanation, then, for the fact that international financial regimes have made some progress in achieving efficiency-oriented gains, but these gains often have accrued to developed nations and the financial sectors within these nations. But even if we are content to focus on states as the main source of financial regulation, we must explain how states aggregate interests over regulation. To argue that states are the primary actors in some international regulatory efforts says little about states' preferences over rules. Presumably, these desires are rooted 15 In the Financial Stability Forum, each G-7 nation has three seats, for a finance ministry official, a central bank official, and a financial regulatory authority; another sixteen (of 41) seats are held by representatives from the IMF, World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements and related entities; and five seats are held among Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and Singapore. Slaughter describes it as a "network of networks" (2004, p. 135) . The FSF's twelve standards, discussed below, relate to financial sector operations (banking, securities); market integrity (accounting, money laundering); and transparency (data and policymaking). 16 Also see Eichengreen's (2003) account of how different regulatory bodies dealt with the "hedge fund problem" in the wake of the 1998 Long Term Capital Management collapse. As a "club," the FSF was primarily concerned about global financial stability, but not about market manipulations by private actors or allocative efficiency.
in domestic politics, as well as in state calculations' about its strategic position vis-à-vis other states.
One plausible assertion is that state interests tend to reflect the demands of the domestic financial sector, particularly when regulatory issues are highly technical. As a result, states' positions on financial regulatory issues may reflect the demands of a narrow group of private sector ("transnational") actors, as well as those of national regulatory authorities ("transgovernmental" actors). State interests on global issues (for instance, environmental and labor standards) often are diffuse, creating space for private actors to develop their own set of standards, or for private actors to play key roles in which standards are ultimately selected. 18 Some accounts of private sector involvement view it as a deliberate choice by governments (Drezner 2003a , Farrell 2003 , Pauly 2002 , while others treat it as the unintended consequence of capital market openness and technological advances (Helleiner 1994 , Porter 1999 , Strange 1996 , Underhill 2000 .
The participation of private sector actors in global governance is not entirely new, of course.
The law merchants of early modern Europe facilitated the functioning of long-distance exchange by collecting and supplying information (Milgrom et al 1990 ; also see Cutler 2003) , not unlike credit ratings agencies of the contemporary era. The Corporation for Foreign Bondholders acted, in preWorld War I London, as a repository of information about sovereign borrowers, as well as the chief representative for investors' in cases of sovereign default (Eichengreen 1999 , Mosley 2003a . In that same era, several very wealthy families conducted great amounts of multinational lending, information sharing, and government financing (Ronit and Schneider 2000) . And, as Kahler (2004) reports, "much of the interwar era was dominated by private governance (oil) or public private networks (finance) in which formal intergovernmental organizations played a negligible role" (p. 14).
Furthermore, while the recent effort to address various standards and codes collectively dates only to the late 1990s, some of the constituent standards (e.g. banking supervision, money laundering) date to the 1980s.
Types of Private Sector Participation.
In assessing the impact of private sector involvement in international finance, I categorize private (non-governmental) actors as either commercial or non-commercial. Private commercial actors include financial institutions (such as banks and investment funds), corporations (national or multinational), industry and professional associations, and individual (particularly very wealthy) investors. Non-commercial private actors include non-governmental organizations with interests in human rights, labor rights, and economic development; experts not involved on the side of financial institutions; and various other forms of transnational advocacy (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reinicke 1999) . These non-commercial actors also can play a role, particularly in terms of the governance of longer-term foreign direct investment.
For instance, rights-oriented organizations often serve as monitors of existing rules, pushing MNCs to meet established standards for working conditions and environmental protection. And NGOs can assist in the development of -or retard the development of, as in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiations -rules governing corporate behavior (Haufler 2000 , Smythe 2000 .
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In the remainder of this paper, however, I concentrate on private commercial actors.
Private commercial actors (hereafter, "private actors") could be involved in the development Forum. In other cases, public authorities create rules, but private actors bear primary responsibility for enforcement (Farrell 2003) . Lastly, private actors can serve as enforcers -but not as creators --of publicly-developed rules. Private actors could be the primary enforcers of rules, or they could provide supplemental enforcement, in addition to that provided by public bodies. The latter is more common, but it also allows for rules to be used in unanticipated ways. For instance, in the EU, the criteria for pre-EMU economic policies (the Maastricht convergence criteria) and post-EMU fiscal policies (the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP) represent yet another combination of public and private sector involvement in rule-setting and enforcement. Both sets of rules were set by public authorities; again, however, they shared enforcement duties with the private sector. While EU governments could decide to exclude Maastricht violators from membership in EMU, and they may decide collectively to fine violators of the SGP, they also have assumed that private market actors will implement the rules. That is, governments that violate either set of rules (by running large 24 Fox et al (2002) argue that the public sector ought to play a greater role in the development of corporate social responsibility-oriented standards but that, thus far, MNCs, consumers, and investors have played the biggest roles in the development of global rules. The set of codes of corporate conduct recently reviewed by the OECD (2001) was comprised mainly of codes from companies (48%) and from associations (37%), with the remainder of codes based in "partnerships of stakeholders" (13%) and IGOs (2%). 25 On joint -or "hybrid" --governance, see Cutler 2003 , Farrell 2003 , Mattli 2003 and Underhill 2000 government budget deficits) will be charged higher rates of interest in the government bond market (Mosley 2004 Private sector participation at the design stage should increase the success of regulatory efforts (as in Hypothesis 2 below), but it also will alter the nature of international governance. The linkages between who makes the rules and the character of the rules will influence both equity (in terms of who wins and loses) and efficiency (in terms of how smoothly global capital markets operate).
Slaughter (2004) puts this more starkly: "the problem [with private global policy networks], however, is ensuring that these actors uphold the public trust" (p. 9).
If this hypothesis is correct, it presents a conundrum for the international community. Given that private sector actors control a great deal of financial resources, and given that compliance with rules depends on their behavior, it is important to "bail in" these entities (Eichengreen 1999 , Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002 , Underhill and Zhang 2003 . But these actors may have very different views 27 Of course, other private sector actors (such as rights-and development-oriented NGOs) sometimes are involved in creating international rules. For instance, corporate codes of conduct and "corporate social responsibility" efforts reflect NGO influence (Haufler 2000 , OECD 2001 . The role of such actors in financial regulation, though, is much less than that of private investors, credit ratings agencies, and MNCs. Slaughter (2004) suggests that transgovernmental networks, which are comprised of national officials with domestic accountability, could be a solution to the problem of unaccountable private actors.
from other affected parties, such as developing countries. Private financial actors often will not act on the basis of public interest, and they are even less accountable to domestic publics than are indirectlydemocratic IGOs (Eatwell and Taylor 2002; Zhang 2003, Vojta and Uzan 2003) . And they will be loathe to sign off on rules that do not serve their interests, as King and Sinclair (2003) suggest has happened with the attempted revisions of the Basel Accords.
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Second, global rules often depend on private sector actors for implementation (Eichengreen 1999, Vojta and Uzan 2003) , 29 and the prospects for private enforcement are linked inextricably to the rule-making process. Where private sector involvement in rule design is greater, we can expect more successful private sector adoption and enforcement of those international rules. I predict that Implementation and enforcement of international regulatory frameworks will be more successful, all else equal, where private sector involvement in institutional design is greater (Hypothesis 2).
In other words, when global rules require private enforcement, they also benefit from private involvement in their development (e.g. IMF 2003). The more consistent rules are with private actors' interests and beliefs, the more likely they are to help enforce such rules (Mosley 2003b ). Moreover, private actors' technical expertise can be used to improve the sophistication of public regulatory authorities (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002, Mattli 2003) .
Decentralized enforcement via private market activity gives "bite" to international regulatory efforts (e.g. Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). In turn, governments' willingness to subscribe to and comply with such rules depends on the rules' perceived costs and benefits. Benefits of standards flow directly from private markets, as compliant governments receive better treatment than non-28 King and Sinclair (2003) argue that private actors do not like the proposed Basel II Accords, because they seem to promise only higher costs and increased competition. Griffith-Jones (2003b) makes a different argument: by not acknowledging the benefits of international portfolio diversification, the accords may "institutionalize the unwillingness of banks to lend to developing countries because it is going to use banks' own risk models to determine the level of capital requirements….As developing countries are perceived as high risk, they will have to pay more." (p. 270). She also argues that the new Basel Accords would amplify the pro-cyclical nature of international capital flows. 29 On issues of compliance with international law, see Downs, Rocke and Barsoon 1995 , Mitchell 1994 , and Simmons 2000 compliant ones. Hence, widespread government adoption of the standard requires that market actors respond to the standard, and that governments care about these market reactions. Institutional effectiveness is closely tied to the nature of the standard, and to the subsequent behavior of private market actors (Germain 2001) .
Taken together, these hypotheses highlight the effect of the form of governance on distributional outcomes, as well as on their success in implementation (compliance). Table 2 summarizes these hypotheses, as well as the relationships they imply between dependent and independent variables. These conjectures suggest that private sector participation at the design stage should increase the success of regulatory efforts, but it also will alter the distributional nature of the regulatory institution. While the regulation of international finance can provide the public good of global financial stability, it also can provide private benefits to specific groups -for instance, to private commercial actors rather than to national publics, or to developed rather than to developing nations. As such, private sector involvement could reinforce, rather than rectify, problems currently Degree of private sector involvement in rule-making.
• Changes over time in distributional outcomes (across nations) with rule implementation.
• Variation (within or between country) in distributional outcomes across rules.
• Variation in distributional outcomes between participating and non-participating countries.
(Effectiveness hypothesis)
Degree of private sector involvement in rule-making and rule enforcement.
• Level of compliance with or implementation of a given global regulation.
• Success of a given regulation in promoting financial stability (controlling for other relevant factors) associated with providing efficient and equitable global regulation. This is the tri-lemma identified in discussions of contemporary global governance: "we need global rules without centralized power but with government actors who can be held to account…" (Slaughter 2004, p. 10) .
IV. Initial Evidence
Evaluating these hypotheses requires the collection of systematic data across a variety of global rules and financial issue areas -for instance, on insurance, banking regulation, and fiscal transparency. Additionally, assessing the distributional effects of regimes (Hypothesis 1) requires either a comparison of effects on developing countries across regulatory sectors (that is, identifying outcomes that are affected by a specific set of rules, but not by other rules), or the comparison of countries that adopt a given set of rules with those that do not. Such evidence would allow us to confirm what we likely expect to be true: private sector actors tend to serve private interests (e.g.
Slaughter 2004
). These empirical tasks, however, are left for future research. This section reviews briefly the broader literature on the success of current financial governance arrangements, and then offers a first-cut empirical assessment of the second hypothesis. I assess Hypothesis 2 using the correlation between global regulatory performance in specific issue areas and the degree of private sector involvement in standard-setting.
Current financial governance and developing nations. While contemporary financial
globalization may offer benefits to some actors and some nations, it generates costs for others. This is at the core of equity-oriented concerns: who wins and loses from financial openness, and what does this imply for globalization's political sustainability? Borrowing from Thomas Freidman, Keohane and Nye (2001) observe "the problem is that, in many countries, some citizens get more of the gold while others feel more of the [straight]jacket." 30 30 Keohane and Nye 2001, p. 255 . Econometric analyses of trends in world income inequality reach varied conclusions. In a medium-term perspective, there has been a divergence across countries in income per capita during the last four decades. But over the longer term (from 1820), world inequality among individuals peaked in the midtwentieth century; world income distribution today is similar to that in 1950. See Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) .
Empirical studies of the performance of developing nations within the international financial system highlight problems with equity, as well as with efficiency. While these problems often have domestic roots, they also are related to the current governance of international finance. Although none of these studies examine variation in governance across financial issues (as a proper assessment of Hypothesis 1 would do), they do suggest financial regulation often falls short. Successful governance of international capital markets should allow capital flows to variety of low-and middleincome nations (at risk-adjusted rates of return), 31 as well as a medium to long-run stability of these flows. These capital flows could offer a variety of benefits, including higher rates of growth, poverty alleviation, intertemporal consumption smoothing, greater macroeconomic policy discipline, The volatility that characterizes international capital markets reduces the benefits of liberalization. While financial globalization offers developing countries greater access to resources and higher levels of growth, it also brings with it a higher likelihood of crisis. Conceição (2003) reports that between 1975 and 1998, there were 116 currency crises, 42 banking crises, and 26 twin Regulatory features are not the only cause of the global capital market deficiencies, of course, but they do play a role. 35 In some substantive areas, such as FDI, there is simply little global regulation. In other cases, the problem is the structure of current regulatory regimes. For example, while the Bretton Woods financial institutions might promote the efficient allocation of capital, recent studies suggest that their actions often are conditioned by political --rather than economic --factors, and that IMF programs are associated -even once selection effects are considered -with lower rates of economic growth (Stone 2002 , Vreeland 2003 . And in still other cases, the problem is one of compliance with regulatory frameworks. For instance, between the late 1980s and the late 34 For a stronger view of the costs to developing countries, see Eatwell (1996) . He argues that the benefits of financial liberalization generally accrue to developed nations and that borrowers pay higher real interest rates. 36 Not all twelve of the FSF's twelve key standards would be classified in this cell, however. For instance, the FATF efforts at money laundering are more public sector-based; and accounting and securities regulations are more private-sector based. 37 Note the contrast, below, between Basel I (1988) and Basel II (2004) . 38 On the global anti-corruption movement, see Sandholtz and Gray 2003. agencies develop standards regarding appropriate economic policies; by relying on these ratings for asset allocation decisions, private investors serve to enforce these standards. standards for auditing and related matters. IFAC's members are national auditors' associations, and IFAC urges its members to incorporate global standards into their codes of behavior and to pressure national regulators to adopt these global standards. As in the accounting sphere, there are hints of public sector involvement in enforcement, as national regulatory authorities become increasingly 39 One also could note that these credit ratings sometimes are used by public actors; for instance, the revised Basel Accords proposed to use them as a guide to the risk profile of banks' assets. Their main use, though, remains within the private sector. 40 The IASB and the FASB formally agreed, in September 2002, to work toward the convergence of the IASB's IAS and the US Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures. Crouzet and Véron 2002, however, note that many large US firms lobbied against adopting IASB principles, as they worried about declining influence over accounting rules. Similarly, European banking institutions intensely opposed the EU's adoption of IASB rules on the treatment of derivatives ("fair value" accounting), and it is likely that the standards will be applied differently in different member states (Economist, October 21, 2004) . 41 On problems of enforcement of accounting standards, see Quinn 2004. interested in auditing practices (witness, for instance, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley legislation), and as IFAC seeks to preserve the reputation of the auditing profession in light of recent corporate scandals.
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Another example that combines private rule establishment with mixed enforcement mechanisms is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The ICC began to create various systems of international commercial arbitration in the 1920s, filling gaps where public sector regulation was weak or non-existent (Ronit and Schneider 2000) . By its own account, the ICC took the lead in establishing worldwide acceptance of arbitration as the best means of solving international commercial disputes. The ICC has administered over 12,000 arbitration cases (involving parties from over 170 states and territories) since its founding, and it continues to create new measures in international trade and business law. For instance, it now sets codes of conduct in the realm of advertising (Cutler 2003) . While the ICC's standards are enforced mainly in the private sector, IGOs also have welcomed their standards.
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Intermediate areas of Table 3 reflect instances of joint governance; many contemporary instruments of financial governance fall into these cells. To take an example, IMF staff negotiates the terms of structural adjustment programs, and these are approved by the Executive Directors, acting as agents of member governments. By tying the disbursement of funds to the fulfillment of conditionality, the IMF also enforces these programs. But, on both dimensions, the IMF draws significantly from the private sector: the Fund's ideas of appropriate adjustment polices are tied very closely to those of the private financial sector (e.g. Gould 2003) . And if the IMF is an effective signal to private investors, non-compliance with IMF programs can result not only in the suspension of IMF financing, but also in the reduction of private capital flows.
The Basel Committee's rules on capital adequacy for banks (banking supervision) also involve a mixture of public and private. The 1988 Accords (Basel I) were created largely in the public sphere, with strong influence from the US and UK, as well as from G-10 central bankers generally (Kapstein 1992) . In revising the accords (Basel II, (Quinn 2004 ). The final "mixed" type is that of data dissemination (as well as EU fiscal policy, discussed in Section II above). The IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), which encourages national governments to provide high-quality 47 Schneider (2003) discusses some of the problems with the IMF's Reports on the Observation of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), which are a key part of recent surveillance efforts. 48 The inclusion of global financial standards in IMF loan conditions could create asymmetric pressures for compliance, as they would apply only to nations that borrow from the IMF (Schneider 2005) . 49 The EU-US Safe Harbor arrangement also would fit, according to Farrell's account, in this cell. 50 Following objections from various European governments and firms, this requirement has been modified; adoption of international accounting standards is mandatory only for listed entities that prepare consolidated financial statements. 51 Mattli and Büthe (2003) offer a similar account of the establishment of product standards: these rules sometimes (but not always) are adopted by national governments and are often included in trade agreements, but they are set almost entirely by private sector bodies. economic data in a timely fashion, also was established publicly, but relies partially on the private sector for enforcement. Investors, however, have been slow to embrace the IMF-sponsored data dissemination regime (Mosley 2003b) . 53 As a result, the SDDS lacks a credible enforcement mechanism, and many governments have been slow to adopt the standard. scale, including "no compliance,", "intent declared," "enacted," "compliance in progress," and "full compliance." I assign ordinal scores to these categories, ranging from zero for no compliance to four for full compliance.
Figure 1 provides information on the average levels of compliance with various global standards, for OECD, emerging market, and all nations. Higher scores represent greater compliance.
The charts are arranged with more "public" standards on the left side, and more "private" ones on the right. For this figure, the enforcement and establishment dimensions of Table 3 are collapsed.
Governance arrangements are considered mostly public (money laundering, fiscal transparency, monetary transparency, payments and insolvency), mixed public-private (data dissemination, corporate governance, bank supervision, securities regulation, and insurance supervision), and mostly private (accounting and auditing).
Insert Figure 1 here.
As we would expect, compliance levels are highest among OECD countries; these countries are both more involved in rule-making and in possession of greater technical resources. And in most cases, there is greater variation among emerging market than among OECD outcomes. 58 In both the overall and the emerging markets samples, compliance is highest with rules regarding monetary policymaking transparency, money laundering, payment systems (principles and central bank), and banking supervision. The average compliance score for these measures ranges from 1.64 (payments in emerging markets) to 2.6 (monetary policy transparency in the entire sample), on a five point (zero to four) scale. Money laundering, monetary transparency, and payments principles were publiclycreated rules, and one could argue that the pressure from powerful countries (in the case of the FATF), as well as from the IMF (in the case of monetary policymaking) motivates this compliance.
Global banking regulations are based on a combination of public and private sector activity (the latter more for Basel II than for Basel I); as such, relatively high compliance with those rules provides modest support for Hypothesis 2. Interestingly, the difference in average compliance levels between emerging market and developed countries is much smaller for banking supervision (2.9 for OECD nations; 1.9 for emerging markets) than for money laundering (3.18 and 1.80, respectively) and monetary transparency (3.77 and 2.14).
The next set of standards, in terms of compliance outcomes, includes fiscal transparency (overall compliance level of 2.09), data dissemination (2.0 overall), securities regulation (1.97), and insurance supervision (1.81). Again, there is some variation in the extent to which OECD performance exceeds that in emerging markets, with the largest differences in securities regulation and fiscal transparency. What do these outcomes tell us about the impact of private sector participation on regulatory performance? The answer is mixed: fiscal transparency and data dissemination were established largely in the public sphere, while securities regulation and insurance supervision reflect a mix of public and private rule-making. Despite these differences, their compliance levels are relatively similar, suggesting (not surprisingly) that other factors are at play.
For instance, the fact that emerging markets comply at higher rates with data dissemination and fiscal transparency rules might suggest that IMF and World Bank influence plays an important role.
The weakest standards, in terms of the compliance rates reported in Figure 1 , are corporate governance (1.66 average, overall), auditing (1.57), insolvency (1.53) and accounting (0.62).
Compliance with corporate governance rules is higher in the OECD (a mean of 1.9), but sits between "intent declared" and "enacted") for the entire set of nations. A similar pattern holds for insolvency, where OECD nations comply at a higher rate (2.05, compared to 1.23 in emerging markets).
Insolvency rules were established at the public-private nexus, as were corporate governance rules; corporate governance rules rely more on mixed enforcement. But, in both cases, it may be true -but this is very tentative --that greater private sector participation could generate greater pressures for compliance. regulating others (using market discipline to reward or punish governments). These could be cases in which self-regulation fails to provide appropriate incentives for compliance. It also could be a case in which, unless standards also are embraced by public sector bodies -for instance, by stock market regulators -there are few incentives for developed or developing nations to expend the resources required for compliance. The results for accounting do, in fact, fit with recent work that questions the extent to which the IASB's rules are enforceable (e.g. Crouzet and Véron 2002, Glaum and Street 2003) . In their study of compliance by companies listed on the German Neuer Markt, Glaum and Street find substantially lower levels of compliance with IASB rules than with US GAAP -perhaps reflecting the IASB's lack of regulatory bite. The low levels of compliance also could reflect recent EU-US tensions regarding the delineation of appropriate accounting standards.
59 Estandards Forum's assessments of international accounting standards were updated in November 2004, to reflect the IASB's recent revisions to International Accounting Standards. Prior to this revision, the average level of compliance was 1.10 (still the lowest implementation rate among the 13 standards).
This result also suggests that market-based discipline in not always an effective means of enforcement. Where private sector enforcement is aimed at governments, market-based discipline assumes that private markets are efficient, in terms of responses that correspond quite closely to violations. Recent booms and busts in global capital markets suggest otherwise, as does the lack of market-based enforcement of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact (Mosley 2004) . 60 This problem provides another reason for pause about the Basel II Accords: in some instances, private credit ratings will be used to judge the adequacy of banks' capital reserves. But credit ratings can be procyclical, and ratings are more likely to exist for developed (than for developing) nations, increasing the stringency of regulations on developing country banks. And it is quite possible for governments and banks to "forum shop" in an effort to obtain higher ratings (King and Sinclair 2003 This very preliminary analysis, but it raises important issues. First, are private actors appropriate enforcers of standards? Do private investors, for example, prioritize the same substantive areas and promote the same rules that international financial institutions or national governments do?
62 This assumes that investors respond to the information contained in ROSCS, via either their own reading of the reports, or via the effects of the reports on their information sources (such as credit ratings agencies). Petrie's (2003) recent survey of credit ratings agencies suggests awareness of the fiscal transparency standard and the ROSCs on fiscal transparency; 86% of the 41 agency staff surveyed was aware of the code, and 71% had read part of a fiscal ROSC. Those surveyed reported that, on average, the ROSCs had a minor impact on their assessments of countries. Also see Schneider 2005. (e.g. Kenen 2001 , Mosley 2003b , Schneider 2003 . Or, given the potential problems with selfregulation, might hybrid systems (private enforcement, but accompanied or backstopped by public enforcement) be best (see Farrell 2003) ? Second, are all forms of private sector participation equal?
It may be the case that, while some types of private involvement promote compliance, other types detract from it. As suggested above, it may matter if the private sector engages in self-regulation (enforcing rules on itself) versus in enforcement against other private actors or against national governments.
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Third, why are developed nations substantially more compliant than emerging markets (as we might expect) in some cases, but only marginally more compliant than others? If international financial institutions or private investors press governments to comply, these pressures should be greatest on developing countries. At the same time, though, these pressures could vary across substantive issues, and they could be offset by domestic political and technical capacity issues.
Furthermore, what are the linkages among various financial standards? Standards may not operate independently of one another. For instance, a country that is responsive to IMF pressure regarding fiscal transparency practices may be more likely also to change its data dissemination procedures.
Perhaps, then, there are not many separate standards (as Tables 1 and 3 suggest), but a smaller set of "regime complexes" or "networks of networks" in global finance (Raustiala and Victor 2004, Slaughter 2004 ).
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Finally, how does the "private actor participation" variable interact with other causal influences to produce regulatory outcomes? Recent literature on compliance has identified several important factors, and these should be integrated into future analyses (Simmons 2000) . For instance, when international rules mesh with domestic laws and institutions, they are more likely to be 63 Cutler et al 1999 differentiate between these two types of private sector involvement. 64 Factor analysis on the E-standards data, however, suggests at least five clusters of standards.
effective (Pistor 2000; Underhill and Zhang 2003) ; 65 but a one-size-fits-all approach that seeks to implement identical global standards in all developing countries is unlikely to succeed.
Unfortunately, many recent reforms have been implemented in isolation, or without consideration of sequencing issues (see Sundararajan et al 2001) . And particularly in developing nations, successful implementation often requires national capacity-building, which is often missing from contemporary efforts at global governance.
V. Conclusion
The successful governance of international finance could improve the overall allocation of investment, prevent financial crises, lower transaction costs, and promote a more equitable distribution of resources. But financial regulation often falls short. Investment often does not flow to where it is most needed, and financial crises are a recurring feature of the contemporary global economy. Moreover, the rules that exist tend to be biased toward developed nations and private financial actors in terms of their assignments of rights and benefits. I have argued that the forum in which rules are set -public versus private, as well as clubs vs. universes -affects the nature of the rules themselves. I maintain that, while understudied, private sector participation has important implications for the effects, and effectiveness, of global financial rules. Private sector involvement in rule-setting can help to increase compliance with regulations, but that it also will change the distributive nature of global governance. As a result, gains in efficiency could be offset by reductions in equity.
Of course, there are many models of private-public involvement in financial regulation, and each permutation differs in its implications for equity and efficiency. The consequences for global cooperation of new and varied forms of rule-setting may be far-reaching, but our understanding of these consequences is, thus far, limited. The challenge is not only to improve the governance of international finance, but also to determine the most appropriate means of doing so. The paper offers a preliminary empirical assessment of the "effectiveness" component of this argument; the reported evidence, though, is quite weak. There is, however, fruitful empirical ground to be covered, in terms of exploring more systematically the implications of private sector participation for the quality of global governance, and in terms of looking at a wider set of governance regimes in financeincluding corporate codes of conduct and sovereign credit ratings --than those analyze in Section IV.
Exploring the impact of the private sector on financial governance outcomes also returns us to the issue of accountability. How can we involve the private sector in governance (increasing efficiency) without deleterious effects on equity? Are certain forms of private sector involvement compatible with private incentives for compliance, and yet not too skewed toward private interests?
Slaughter suggests that transgovernmental policy networks may be, as more accountable counterweights to private networks, the solution to this quandary. They could act "as the spine of broader policy networks, including intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, corporations, and other interested actors, thereby guaranteeing wider participation in government network activities but also retaining an accountable core of government officials" (2004, pp. 28-29) . This is an optimistic claim, one which should be evaluated as part of a general assessment of the causal effects of both private and transgovernmental governance. 
